The Prime Minister & Cabinet
Introduction:
Prime Minister’s power depends upon particular incumbent’s personality, style, on political circumstances (i.e., majority in Parliament), and on good fortune (i.e., absence of scandals). Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1964-1970 and 1974-1976) described the Prime Minister as being like a conductor of an orchestra, the orchestra being the various ministers, departments of state, etc.
Choosing a Prime Minister
The role of the Crown
The Monarch must appoint as Prime Minister- the person who commands a majority in the House of Commons or who is in the best position to form and sustain a government in office. Hence, in theory Monarch’s role is to appoint but not to choose.
It has been suggested that however, in certain circumstances the Monarch might still have to become involved in the decision-making process. This would be most likely to occur- where an election produced a ‘hung Parliament’ i.e., a Parliament in which no single party had an overall majority in the House of Commons. There had been only five hung parliaments in the 20th Century i.e., January 1910, December 1910, December 1923, May 1929, February 1974). These latter instances provide the following approach that would be appropriate for the Monarch in the given circumstances:
For the Monarch to allow the incumbent PM, now no longer with a majority, to be given an opportunity to form a further administration. This might be a minority government if the PM still leads the largest single party or a government with cross-party support- perhaps a coalition (illustration-1931 National Coalition).
If this proves impossible, for the Monarch to invite the leader of the largest single party, if not the PM, to see if he or she is able to form a viable minority or cross-party majority administration.
If this fails, for the Monarch, on advice, to invite any other party leader, or person capable of forming a government to see if an alternative administrative administration may be formed.
All of these possibilities having been considered or exhausted, to dissolve Parliament so that a further election may be held.
- The final determination of policy to be submitted to Parliament;
- the supreme control of the national executive in accordance with the policy prescribed by parliament;
- the continuous co-ordination and delimitation of the interests of the several departments of state.
(a) Cabinet committees
Until 1992, the exact number, designation, and composition of these Cabinet Committees was not made public. Mrs Thatcher reportedly had some 25 such standing committees and another 110 ad-hoc working parties. They are usually chaired by a Cabinet minister and will consist of other ministers, mostly not of Cabinet rank, from those departments with an interest in a particular committee's area of responsibility. Most are permanent but ad-hoc committees may be setup to deal with or oversee a particular problem.
Their Principal Functions are to co-ordinate the activities of the various departments of state, to formulate policy suggestions or proposed courses of executive action for Cabinet consideration, and to deal with and make recommendations related to any other matter referred to them.
In 1992, the principal committees included: economic and domestic policy (Chaired by PM); industrial, commercial, and consumer affairs (chaired by Leader of House of Lords); Local Government (Leader of the House of Commons); Queen's Speech and future Legislation (Leader of House of Commons); Legislation (Leader of the House of Commons); Civil Service (Leader of House of Commons, to name the few.
(b) Inner and Partial Cabinets
Partial Cabinet refers to a group of Cabinet Ministers selected by the PM to direct and co-ordinate some aspect of government action, often in relation to a matter of urgency or where expedition is needed to deal with an immediate and serious threat to the national interest, i.e., such use by Mrs Thatcher during the Falklands War (1982). Such informal ministerial groups can be used to thwart or obstruct the plans of particular ministers. For example- after the inner city riots of 1981 Michael Heseltine (Minister for the Environment) proposed a major spending programme to deal with inner city dereliction.
The inner cabinet consists of that small group of particularly trusted senior ministers, usually holding key Cabinet posts, to whom the PM may refer for advice and support on an informal and confidential level. The decisions and courses of action proposed by such powerful groupings are unlikely to be defeated when and if put before a Cabinet meeting.
(c) Matters Outside Cabinet Control
Given their special nature, certain specific government responsibilities are not subject to direct Cabinet control including:
- The power of Prime Ministerial Patronage;
- The Power to advise dissolution;
- The Prerogative of Mercy (the matter for Home Secretary);
- The formation of the Budget (the matter for the Chancellor and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury in consultation with the Prime Minister and those ministers directly affected by a particular proposal).
In constitution theory- the control of the national executive remains a primary function of the Cabinet, although for practical reasons- the degree of control which it actually able to exercise over the extensive machinery of central government is for a variety of reasons, somewhat limited.
It is not possible for a body of some 20-25 persons, which meets only once or twice per week to be fully appraised of, or make decisions in relation to all the concerns of the various government departments. More detail consideration and supervision of departmental activity and policy tends to be undertaken by Cabinet Committees and Sub-Committees and in negotiations between PM, Chancellor, Cabinet Secretary, and individual ministers.
As the machinery of government began to grow doubts grew concerning the validity of theory that ministers control their departments and that collectively, they exercise effective authority over the entire central government bureaucracy. Recently, the arguments relating to the size and complexity of government appear to have affected executive interpretation of the convention of ministerial responsibility. Hence, it is common for ministers to plead that they should not be expected to take the blame for the actions and decisions of civil servants which they had not directly sanctioned or were not aware of (i.e., Scott Inquiry). Such concern about the effectiveness of Cabinet and Ministerial control of government departments led to introduction of mechanisms for the rigorous security of executive activity, including the appointments of the Parliamentary Commissioner (1967) and the Health Service Commissioner (1974), the creation of the system of departmental parliamentary select committees, and the setting up of the National Audit Office (1983) to give assistance to the work of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Continuous co-ordination of the several departments of state
It is one of the Primary Functions of Cabinet committees and sub-committees. The process of co-ordination is also assisted by the work of the Cabinet Secretariat. Gradually, PMs have tried to improve the extent of co-ordination by restructuring the departmental composition of central government. Hence, the Department of the Environment (established in 1971) now encompasses local government, housing and planning, all of which at various times, have been the responsibilities of separate ministries.
Reasons for Cabinet Confidentiality
It is supported by various political, conventional, and legal rules. In party-political sense it is something which helps preserve an image of a united and focused administration. It also underpins various public interests including the need for candour (the quality of being open and honest) and plain-speaking in ministerial deliberations, and the benefits related to defence, counter-subversion, and sensitive aspects of foreign policy.
The major conventional rules operating in this context are collective and individual ministerial responsibility, which force the ministers to either close ranks and give unreserved support to all government actions and decisions or to relinquish office through resignation or dismissal. When faced with this choice of job or conscience, the recent trend is that ministers chose the job. This is a compromise which enables particular policy preferences to be pursued from within and of course, does less immediate damage to hopes of political advancement.
The legal rules of most obvious relevance in this context are those relating to the equitable doctrine of confidentiality and to the common law concept of public interest immunity.
At the moment, ministers (or ex-ministers) may be restrained from publishing information entrusted to them in the course of their ministerial responsibilities, if this would damage the public interest in government confidentiality or adversely affect national security (Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape). The rules of public interest immunity prevent the use of Cabinet papers in legal proceedings except in very limited circumstances (Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090).
Bibliography
Alex Carroll, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CHAPTER 11 THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET, (Financial Times Management 1998) p 183-198.